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  • br Job shift and worker

    2018-11-13


    Job shift and worker’s effort: theory and evidence from the literature
    Methodology and data
    Descriptive analysis In this section, I present a summary descriptive analysis related to the sample. The summary statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1. Initially, it is important to highlight that this analysis is restricted to workers who had a job in their first interview, aged 18–65 and who were followed one year after (after 12 months). At the end of the follow-up, part of the respondents was still employed in the same sector, whereas the other part changed the sector of employment. Those who became either unemployed or economically inactive (out of labor force) were excluded. It is important to highlight that the data are from the Brazilian labor market, which has, among the developing countries, one of the highest worker turnover rates. Although the Brazilian labor market is more regulated compared to other developing countries, its legislation contributes to further increase the turnover rates, causing a reverse effect to what it is intended. Traditionally, Brazilian legislation requires that employers must give notice to their employees in the case of dismissal (one month prior to dismissal), and pay a monetary compensation to a worker dismissed without just cause (50% of the amount of Length of Service Guarantee Fund—FGTS). Such costs may even modify worker behavior, encouraging him/her to induce his/her own dismissal. According to Macedo (1985), Amadeo and Camargo (1996), and Barros et al. (1999) this practice is well established and has resulted in negative effects on the part of workers behavior, giving them significant incentives to induce their own dismissal (fake dismissal). Given all the caution and methodology the database requires, out of 255,122 workers, 150,510 (62.5%) are men and 201,524 (75.5%) employed in the private sector, as it can be seen in Table 1. The largest number of public sector workers can be explained by the stronger pde inhibitor of employment (job security) in this sector since I considered two consecutive interviews (1year interval). Moreover, turnover in the private sector makes many workers become unemployed, which meas that they were excluded from the analysis. Regarding the variable gender, thalamus is observed that man’s participation is higher in the private sector (62.5%) and lower in the public sector (45.8) compared to women. Gornick and Jacobs (1988) have discussed about women been much more likely to be employed in the public sector. The possible reasons for this are associated to job security and income, which is more accentuated in females because of their double work journey. Another important feature between private and public sector is the difference observed in tenure, which is considerably higher in public sector (70.2 months against 30.5 in private sector). This is probably related to the different characteristics common in public and private sectors in Brazil (Barros et al., 1999; Foguel et al., 2000), especially to the fact that public sector is more attractive to security-seeking employees (Gonzaga et al., 2003). So, the rate of dismissal in public sector is much lower than in the private one, and layoffs are quite uncommon, and consequently the tenure is much higher in the public sector. For Bradley et al. (2007), the risk effect in employment loss and promotion opportunities have different intensity among workers, according to the sector occupancy. Therefore, the information contained in Table 1 confirms the predetermined hypotheses since the private sector workers had effort indicators (unpaid overtime work and absence), on average, higher than those from the public sector. As said by Vandenheuvel (1994), it is commonly held that people working in the public sector are more likely to be absent from work than their counterparts in the private sector. One possible explanation is found in Kriegler and Wooden (1990), who state that employees in larger workplaces are more likely to be absent suggesting that absence in larger workplaces, as public firms, may have less effect on output and thus generate less concern among management. Furthermore, the Brazilian private sector is composed of micro and small sized firms (approximately 99% of the total) that are responsible for around 70% of employment in the sector. This could be another relevant explanation for low absence rates in the private sector.